

ЕВРОПА И ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СОЮЗ ГЛАЗАМИ УЧЕНЫХ

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МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ОРГАНОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ВЛАСТИ В ЕВРОПЕЙСКОМ СОЮЗЕ И РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ: ВЗГЛЯД МОЛОДЕЖИ

Л. РОУЗИ

Цель этой статьи – оценить, является ли модель идеальной организации современной администрации в соответствии с типологией Макса Вебера возможной в Европейском союзе, в особенности во Франции, а также возможна ли реализация такой модели в Российской Федерации. В статье анализируется, как это оценивают студенты Томского государственного университета (ТГУ), европейцы и россияне, и насколько их мнение совпадает с официальными данными в государствах-членах ЕС и в Российской Федерации. В статье рассматривается, как соотносится идеальная модель Макса Вебера с тремя выделенными им угрозами: эффективностью, прозрачностью и коррупцией. Полученные данные сравниваются с данными исследования, проведенного междуна-родными организациями.

Ключевые слова: модернизация, государственные администрации, Европейский союз, Россия, Франция, эффективность, транспарентность, коррупция.

IS THE MODERNISATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS A REALITY IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION?

LOLA ROUZE

The purpose of this article is to assess whether Max Weber's ideal-type construction of a modern administration is a reality in European Union (EU) Member States, especially in France, and in the Russian Federation. Moreover, do Tomsk State University (TSU) students, Europeans and Russians, conclude the same as official data in both the EU Member States and the Russian Federation about it? Thus, this article examines the proximity between Max Weber's definition of a modern bureaucracy through three of its main features, namely efficiency, transparency and corruption. Official data is then compared to TSU students' perception of the application of those three principles in both the EU and in Russia.

Keywords: Modernisation, public administrations, European Union, Russia, France, efficiency, transparency, corruption.

The 2017–2018 World Economic Forum Report about Global Competitiveness Stated that in 2016, one of the Russian Federation's major problem for doing business was « *aspects of institutional quality such as property rights (106th), judicial independence (90th), and corruption* »

(1. P. 25). It is important to add that the 2005 Report already classified Russia as the ninety-first country out of one hundred and seventeen in terms of quality of public institutions. One of those problems, corruption, also concerns the European Union¹, as France, for example. Indeed, its Ex-President faces corruption charges and was placed under formal investigation on Wednesday, the 21st of March 2018. He is blamed of having received illegal financial support from Libyan and its leader in 2007, Muammar el-Qaddafi (2).

This puts into doubts public administration systems in the Russian Federation and in the European Union, and brings us firstly to define what is a public administration and the bureaucracy it is linked with, secondly to consider the limits of their modernisation. An administration can be generally defined as *“the entire class of public officials and employees managing the executive department”* (3) and, at a governmental level, as the management and supervision of departments or agencies. Therefore, in this study, a public administration is to be considered as the implementation of the government policy *“so that government can function”* (4). Max Weber defined how it should function to be considered as modern, but this will be explained in the chore of the article. Nonetheless, studying Russian and EU Member States public administration means studying the officials and civil servant’s organisation, as members of *“a body of non-elective government officials” and/or “an administrative policy-making group”* (3), that is to say, a bureaucracy. According to this same Encyclopaedia, it is indeed *“a system of administration wherein there is a specialisation of functions, objective qualifications for office, action according to the adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority and delegated power”*. The bureaucratic form of administration had been theorised by thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, but this study will focus on Max Weber’s theory as he specifically studied its link with modernity. As a historical term, modernity is associated with *“scientific and technological progress and human perfectibility; rationalisation and professionalisation [...] the development of the nation-State and its constituent institutions”* (3).

By considering those definitions, bureaucracy and therefore, public administrations, appear to be tightly tied with modernisation, especially because their progress influences the one of the institutions of a nation-

¹ The European Union will be designed as the EU.

State and allow the induction of a modern bureaucracy. Thus, the aim of this article is to compare public administration's modernisation of both the European Union Member States and the Russian ones by setting side by side their potential evolution or dysfunctions. For that, three major dysfunctions have been identified that are corruption, lack of efficiency and transparency. Their level will be discussed in both areas and compared with Max Weber's definition of a modern bureaucracy. A survey has also been made among Tomsk State University students from Russia and the European Union to evaluate their opinion about the existence and intensity of those criteria among public administrations of both territories.

Indeed, asking them how they perceive public administrations in their countries of origin and in countries they may have travelled to allow a comparison with official data from the European Union and Russia. This has a particular interest given to the very purpose of the administration modernisation, which is to improve its organisation, operation, efficiency and the quality of its public management. Indeed, it could balance the critics directed to the administrative machinery, its slowness and cost, and help governments to improve the relations between administrations and administered, and therefore the services the first ones furnish to the second ones. Nonetheless, even if governments tend to want to establish reforms and to modernise the administration, this is not always efficient and breaches can be found, not just in its establishment but also in the will to put it in place. Finally, even it has evolved, young people may not perceive any difference.

Consequently, two main subjects are going to be discussed. The first one is a data comparison obtained on sites as the OECD, Eurostat, the FSSS, the World Bank and the European Commission ones about EU Member States and Russian public administration characteristics. The second one will be their comparisons with the results of the survey conducted among Tomsk State University students. Its goal was to evaluate their opinion on public administrations of European Union Member States and in the Russian Federation thanks to a questionnaire. This would allow the examination of their possible similarities. Indeed, the employment in general government¹ represents 20% in the Russian Fed-

¹ «The general government sector comprises all levels of government (central, State, local and social security funds) and includes core ministries, agencies, depart-

eration and 16% of the labour force in the OECD countries (5. P. 104), so Russia proportionally employs more civil servants than the OECD countries, but does it mean their administration is more efficient?

Accordingly, this article addresses the following points: Marx Weber's definition of a modern public administration; the actual level of modernisation of EU Member States and the Russian Federation public administrations according three main benchmarks, namely corruption, efficiency and transparency and, finally, a comparison between opinions of TSU students from both areas about them.

A Modern Administration According to Max Weber

Before addressing the influence of the European Union's administrative system's modernisation on the Russian's, it is appropriate to assess its definition, that is to say, to define what are the key elements of a bureaucratic model. For that, we will rely on Max Weber's explanation. Firstly, it appears that a bureaucratic model organises its administrative matters as a company. Therefore, it is possible to identify clear and linear rules the administrative management can apply. Thus, its action appears to be more impersonal and organised according to the principle of division of labour, which implies there is an administrative hierarchy. Moreover, the administration's means are not the bureaucrats' personal property, so they cannot appropriate it to themselves. Furthermore, as writing requirements prevail, records shall be archived. Finally, it is possible to say that officials of such an administration, considering their submission to an administrative discipline, must obey only to the obligations that go with their office. To occupy this last, they should hold a professional qualification, a diploma attesting successful examinations and once they are recruited, they can be controlled. Nevertheless, a proof of the recruitment must exist, in the form of a contract which entitles the official to privileges, such as a life job, treatments, specific career perspectives depending on seniority, pensions, etc. Finally, it is possible to say modern bureaucracy distinguishes itself by the fact that a group of people are used to obey to the chief's orders and is always available. The exercise of power of commandments and constraint is divided in between them to

ments and non-profit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by public authorities » (5).

maintain domination. Indeed, for those officials, this power of command is approved because an order considered as compulsory and exemplary should exist. Therefore, this order appears to be legitimate and, in a modern State, dominants should also obey to this law order. Thus, administrative officials have to comply to the objective duty of their function, without taking into account who is the person in front of them (6). Nonetheless, Russian citizens should face different problems when dealing with their public administration. As such, it is possible to quote its *“inefficiency, corruption and lack of accountability”* (7 p. 117). On its side, EU Member States administrations, as different as they can be, may face rather similar problems. Indeed, *“in the EU there are at least 20 million bribes paid (petty corruption experiences) every year”* (8. P. 2). Therefore, is Max Weber’s ideal-type construction a reality in EU Member States and Russia?

According to Max Weber, a purely bureaucratic administration, based on the compliance with acts, the so-called bureaucratic-monocratic administration, is precise, permanent, disciplined and rigid. As it is predictable by the ones who hold power as well as by citizens, it inspires trust. Its aims are to achieve technical perfection and to be as performing as possible, especially because of the growing need of a mass administration of both people and goods. This rational-legal authority can be found in several institutions as the State, the Church, the army, economic companies, interest groups, associations or even foundations. Moreover, Max Weber asserts that the development of those modern groups goes together with the development and the continuous progression of the bureaucratic administration, and the raising of this last is typical of modern occidental States (9). However, bureaucratisation as a modern phenomenon appeared in those States at the same time as a monetary economy and a growing capitalism. Indeed, capitalism needed a more secure and predictable law to reinforce itself and a rational bureaucracy was the best way to reach it. For instance, occidental States required a fiscal administration to finance permanent armies on the continent, and thus constructed and expanded a modern apparatus of administration and civil servants. For that, they enhanced their technique in both information and transport fields as well as they expanded the quality and quantity of the States’ missions (6).

However, Russia’s administrative system historically could not be qualified as a bureaucratic administration as Weber defined it. Indeed, Russia’s administrative limits can be found in its own history, starting

with the Soviet administration. In fact, Soviet and post-Soviet State-building strategies participated in the elaboration of a State bureaucracy and initiated the reform of public administration in the administrative system. Nevertheless, *“The Soviet system rejected both the separation of political and administrative spheres and the autonomy of the administrative bureaucracy”* (7. P. 119) as it was very much influenced by the ruling party. This means officials do not necessarily have a qualification when they are employed, contrary to Max Weber’s theory about a modern administration system, that should not be personal-based but merit-based and impersonal. On the contrary, recruitment during the Soviet System was politicised and led by the party-administered nomenklatura¹ system, not a ruled-oriented rationality as established by the Weberian model. Consequently, there was no clear functional division of labour, that is to say, no clear hierarchy people could refer to. On the contrary, it was complex and done in the aim that political leadership could better monitor officials and *“in some respects, the Russian bureaucracy today still resembles its Soviet predecessor far more than any Weberian model”* (7. P. 119). For instance, senior officials and politicians would entitle trusted personal associates to key posts in order to keep their authority on the institution they are in charge of. Nowadays, in post-Soviet Russia, the personalisation of relationships in the bureaucracy exists and weakens the administrative system as it is neither regular nor impartial. Moreover, those officials can turn this weakness to their advantage to accomplish private and/or political, institutional interests and this in return cripples even more the system. Also, this means the exercise of power of commandments and constraint is not divided in between officials to maintain an organised system but is held in a few people’s hands to maintain their own domination, especially by the distribution of rewards. Considering this, it is hard to consider the post-Soviet administrative system as efficient and productive, as working the same way as a company would, contrary to Max Weber’s theories to define a modern State. This is the reason why Russia and EU Member States may initiate reforms.

¹ *“The privileged set of people appointed by patronage to senior positions in the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union and some other Communist States “ (57).*

Reforms Russia, the European Union and France enforced in accordance with the modernisation of public administrations

Firstly, in Russia, the will to associate New Public Management reforms in accordance with Weber's rational bureaucracy gave birth to several reform packages after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Federal law of 1995 for example started to create a Civil Service based on merit. As it was insufficient, in 1997–1998 a new Concept of Administrative reform was formulated but it did not pass through Parliament. Then, in 2000, President Vladimir Putin tried as well to implement a public administration reform which had three main divisions: the Civil Service reform, the Administrative reform and the Municipal government reform.

The first one led to a *“Public Service Reform in the Russian Federation (2003–2005)”* and various laws were adopted. One of them, for example, classifies three types and two levels of Public Service, with a specific legislative framework for each type of it, according to Federal Law #55, launched the 27th of March 2003. In 2004 as well, another federal law¹ introduced important criteria the public administration should follow. For example, the fact that permanent civil servants can be employed under a signed contract is inevitably depending on their results to a competitive examination. However, as this process can be long, prequalified pools² can be appointed to occupy vacant positions in time. Also, as Weber asserted, their obligations should be defined and this reform established that as a job description was meant to counterbalance the *“excessive administrative discretion [as it] is considered to be among the most hazardous preconditions for corruption”* (10. P. 2). For example, it regrouped the qualifications necessary to occupy the position but also performance indicators, as an administration must be as efficient as possible and attain technical perfection. Therefore, the most a civil servant is competent, the most it should be remunerated and have the possibility to be promoted. Furthermore, this federal law was the first one to implement the term of *“conflict of interest”* in the law.

¹ #79

² *“Pre-qualified pool consists of civil servants and other citizens that have been assessed during a competition against a standard of competence for a concrete position within the Civil Service”* (10).

In regard to the administrative reform of 2003, its two main management ideas were to clearly identify the different functions this body underlay, especially to avoid duplications and transfer some functions in other bodies if needed. The results were that “5634 functions were reviewed: 1468 of them were found to be redundant, 263 – duplicative, 868 – subject to reformulation” (10. P. 4). Thereby, in March 2004, government bodies diminished from six to three and their roles have been distinctly demarcated between Ministries, Services and Agencies.

Those important reforms allowed an improvement of Russia’s public-sector quality. International organisations gave support to Russia to achieve this goal, “such as The World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, the European Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Sweden Ministry of Finance and others” (10. P. 8). Nonetheless, the country still has efforts to furnish and a gap differentiates it to the majority of the European Union Member States. Several reasons can explain it, and one of them is that no effective communication between federal executive bodies, the think tanks which are helping them, regional and other administrative levels exist with the citizens. Additionally, there are transparency and freedom of information issues. Mass media does not help it as it does not debate much civil service and administrative reforms, which can explain the fact that citizens are not a lot involved in those subjects either. Another reason is that no peculiar main centre of control oversees and coordinates the reforms. Indeed, even if the Administration of President of the Russian Federation elaborates “new legislation, communicates with international donors and coordinates the reform process” (10. P. 8), it needs an official mandate to be able to prompt a public administration reform, which it has not. Finally, it appears people who drafted the reforms and legislation were not qualified experts but working groups united predominantly by personal relationships, such as lawyers, psychologists, civil servants, etc. To be qualified as experts, those people should have studied in schools specialised in those topics. The problem is, even if some universities are specialised, graduated students prefer working in the private sector because it is better paid.

In the European Union as well, public administrations’ modernisation is an issue the European Commission could not ignore. Indeed, public administrations’ organisation influences both the eventual growth and the well-being of the citizens of a country. “This generates pecuniary bene-

fits and enhances trust in institutions, which in turn increases tax compliance" (11). More precisely, the European Commission has underlined the importance of a cooperative procurement across the EU. Indeed, according to her, central purchasing bodies control bigger parts of public procurement reforms and can better promote them, in order to increase national, regional and municipal procurement. More generally, the European Union wondered itself what was the cost of European administration and whether civil servant was the dream job or not. Indeed, approximately 6% of the annual budget of the EU is spent on staff, administration and maintenance of its buildings. For example, the European Commission is divided into departments are Directorates General, which are similar to ministries. Each Directorate General is run by a Director General, himself reporting to a Commissioner. Moreover, each department embodies a specific policy area or service, for instance, trade or environment. *"Around 32 000 people are employed by the European Commission"* (12), that is to say, four times more than in the general secretariat, the political groups and Members of Parliament and their staff, at the European Parliament. But this has a cost. Indeed, 94% of the European budget is spent in investment in Member States and Third Countries. Therefore, the 6% spent on EU administration do not represent a big amount of money in comparison. Moreover, the wage measured in purchasing power between 2004 and 2011 evolved negatively. Indeed, if in the Netherlands there was a rise of 2,9% of the wage and of 2,3% in Belgium, the civil servants' wage decreased in France (-0,3%), in the UK (-3,2%), in Germany (-4,5%) and, more importantly, in the EU (-7,6%). In consequence, the poorest evolution of wages was in the EU, but it is also the only place among the different ones quoted before where the wage did not increase. Indeed, it increased everywhere, especially in Belgium (+3,6%), except in the EU¹. Furthermore, civil servants' pension contribution is the highest in the EU (11,6%), while it is 0% for Belgium and Germany. Then, the maximum pension of final salary is the less interesting one, as it attains 70% in the EU and 75% in both France and the UK. Germany is not far from the EU, with 71,25%. Finally, the normal retirement age is 63 years old for EU civil servants, which can be considered as average as in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany the normal retirement age is 65 years old, and 60–62 in France (12). As a consequence,

¹ An augmentation of 1,7% was proposed but rejected by the Council (12).

civil servant could not be considered as a dream job in the European Union in 2011. Nonetheless, prior to those results already took place conferences to improve European public administration.

On the 10th, 11th and 12th of May 2000 for example, the first Quality Conference for Public administrations in the EU took place in Lisbon. Its main objectives were to share best practices among all fifteen Member States and *“to explore the experiences and achievements of the public administrations in seeking high standards in public services, using a variety of approaches and methods”* (13). The targeted sectors were public management, the excellence, the use of new technology and the stress on citizen service in public administration. The European Commission also targeted the efficiency of public administration by setting an EU Cohesion Policy fund and reforms under *“Thematic Objective 11”* for 2014–2020. The objective was also to furnish *“Technical Assistance for strengthening the administrative capacity for the management of the funds”* (14). More precisely, the goal of this Thematic objective 11 is *“to create institutions which are stable and predictable, but also flexible enough to react to the many societal challenges, open for dialogue with the public, able to produce new policy solutions and deliver better services”*, according to the same source. The Commission specifies that those objectives should be developed in accordance with Country Specific Recommendations, Economic Adjustment Programmes and National Reform Programmes.

Talking about National Reform Programmes, in default of comparing Russia’s reforms with all the European Union Member States’ ones, this article will focus on France. The French government introduced the General Review of Public Policies and launched three major projects, led by the General Directorate for Administration and the Civil Service (DGAFP) in 2008, as an extension of the 2007 one which was notably dealing with career paths and the renewal of the social dialogue. The main objectives were to improve users’ reception, to simplify requirements and administrative procedures, to enhance administration’s transparency, to encourage citizens to participate to the administrative process, and to make the administrative justice more efficient. Other objectives were to upgrade the management and the performance of the administration, but also to adapt it to the European framework.

For example, in order to better welcome users, this reform wanted to develop one-stop shops. Thus are called counters where it is possible to

ask for several public services. Similarly, as in Russia, it avoids duplications and to better reform administrations. For instance, between 2008 and 2011, Treasury and Tax Services have been merged. Nonetheless, it should not taint the quality of the services rendered. Indeed, the State committed itself to allow users to have an easy access to public services, to be welcomed with courtesy and care, to receive clear answers in a reasonable and advertised delay. Moreover, if they suggest improvements, their propositions have to be listed, as well as their reclamations, which in addition must be effectively and systematically treated. To illustrate this evolution, a few tools have been developed. Firstly, the “*Etalab blog*” suggests to entrepreneurs and administrations to build a new generation of “*entrepreneurs of general interest*”¹. The aim is to improve the public service thanks to numerical evolution, for example by promoting the open source and open data culture in the State. Secondly, a national commission of public debate was created in order to make sure citizens take part of the development and equipment projects’ elaboration of national interest. The condition is that those projects should either have strong social and economic stakes, either have an important impact on the environment or on the territory development. To finish, it is also possible to quote the Marianne repository², which defines the commitments an administration should take in the aim to improve the quality of the reception and of the services offered. Those engagements are taken to give a better accessibility to services, more adapted opening hours, the possibility to make appointments and to receive clear answers in specific and respected delays. As a consequence, the lack of coordination and cooperation among State institutions in the Russian Federation but also in the European Union can be considered as one of the main brakes on administrative reforms. Nonetheless, a few of them have been launched over the years and this emphasises the importance of the modernisation of public administrations. The question therefore is, whether it is possible to conclude that this ideal-type construction is a reality in Europe, especially in France, and in Russia. To study this question, three of its main threats will be tackled: efficiency, corruption and transparency. Indeed, considering Max Weber’s definition of a modern public administration, those

¹ Site: <http://www.etalab.gouv.fr/>

²See: <http://www.modernisation.gouv.fr/documentation/referentiels/le-referentiel-marianne-nouvelle-version>

three elements should not exist. In order to know if they do, two major research strategies have been used.

Sources, Measurements and Indicators

Two major research strategies have been used: (1) a quantitative analysis of country-level data and (2) a case study: Tomsk State University's students' opinion, through a questionnaire. Data have been collected from archives, surveys, published reports and articles. For example, origins of the official data are the OECD Economic Survey about Russian Federation, its Global Competitiveness Report of 2017–2018, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index of 2017, European Commission's surveys, notably thanks to the Eurobarometer, but also World Bank analysis and survey results such as the EY and the Ifop ones. The Federal State Statistics Service of Russia has also been used, as well as Russian authors and newspapers. In regard to the case of study, two questionnaires have been launched on Google Forms. They ask the same questions in two different languages, the English and the Russian language. The target public is Tomsk State University's students from Russia and from EU Member Countries aged under twenty-five years old. Both questionnaires are available online since the 25th of March 2018 and until the 30th of June 2018, forty-five students (thirty-one Russians and fourteen Europeans) filled it out and the results have been very varied.

In what concerns Russian students, most of them were in the third year of Bachelor degree (22,6%) and in the second year of Master degree (19,4%)¹. They were mainly from the Faculty of history (29%) as students from other Faculties represented less than 10% for each Faculty mentioned². As regards of the students from EU Member States, the majority of them also were in the third year of Bachelor degree (64,3%) and in the first year of Master degree (21,4%)³. 50% of them belonged to the

¹ First year of Bachelor degree: 16,1%, second year of Bachelor degree: 9,7%, fourth year of Bachelor degree: 12,9%, others: 12,8%.

² Russian students answered the questionnaire came from the Institute of Art and Culture, Institute the Human of the Digital Era, Faculty of Radiophysics, Faculty of Journalism, of Informatics, of Pre-University training, of Foreign Languages, Mathematics and Computer Science, of Psychology, of Physics, of Philology, of Chemistry.

³ 7,1% were in fourth year of Bachelor degree and the same amount in second year of Master degree.

Foreign Languages Faculty, and then 42,9% from the History Faculty¹. In what concerns European students, they came from the following Member States: United Kingdom (36,4%), Italy (27,3%), France (18,2%), Germany and Greece (9,1% for each country).

An Efficiency Issue Among EU Member States and Russian Public Administrations

As asserted by Max Weber, a modern administration should be working as a company, being efficient and productive. Nevertheless, Russian's policy-makers repeatedly manifested their complaint against the performance of country's civil servants, especially because they could not secure the implementation of policies they enhanced. In 2015, a Russian Member of Parliament from the left wing said that a failure to execute them should be considered as a criminal offense. Therefore, *«heavy fines for failing to properly execute presidential orders would boost discipline among civil servants and help the State get rid of irresponsible officials»* (15). This way, the division of labour would be respected, and the administrative hierarchy could not be irresponsible any more. Indeed, in 2002 already, solely 48% of executive orders issued by the president in 2001 were fulfilled and even if it was better for presidential decrees, the problem was still there in 2015. According to the OECD, Russia's public administration needs to be more transparent and its decisions should be more disputable, especially by non-judicial means, so that citizens can question it more easily. For the OECD, this situation can be explained by the government's will to intervene and control, regulate it. According to its report, Russia's public administration's quality is poor and does not allow the State to endorse the structural reforms the country needs. Moreover, this inefficiency has a cost on ordinary citizens' everyday life as *“the poor quality of public bureaucracies creates real day-to-day hardships for private citizens engaged in such routine tasks as renewing passports, registering poverty purchases or having their cars inspected”* (7. P. 118). Therefore, improving it appears to be a real stake for both the Russian authorities and the citizens who resort to it. A reform of the administration and the civil service have been undertaken since 2000 and

¹ 7,1% were in the Faculty of Geology and Geography, from the Institute of Economics and Management, the Faculty of Pre-University Training and from the Faculty of Philology.

renewed in 2006–2008, especially to actualise it. The first one can be defined as *“the reorganisation of executive bodies and fundamental changes to their methods of work, particularly the way in which they interact with one another and with citizens and organisations”* (7. P. 119). For its part, civil service reform is concentrated on *“the formation and management of the civil service”* (7 p. 119). Moreover, 73,9% of social services employees declared that the quality of their work does not affect their wage, and only 15% of them declared that it was influencing it (16. P. 20). Finally, in Russia, satisfaction with quality and efficiency of public service delivery was 58% for the public health system, 75% for primary and secondary education, 79% for the vocational one, 41% for traffic police, 68% for official documents and 74% for social security benefits and 59% for the unemployment ones, 51% for civil courts. It appears the best rate is for education in general (17. P. 32). However, those evaluations tended to decrease as in 2016 all of them diminished of approximately 10%. The exceptions are the traffic police and official documents services, for which it was the contrary, as well as for the unemployment benefits, which stayed unchanged (18. P. 26).

According to the answers given by Russian students to the questionnaire, most of them (41,9%) think that the EU moderately influences the way public administration work. The second most important percentage signifies that 35,5% of them think it slightly influences them. Therefore, in general, Russian students do not perceive a clear influence of the way EU public administrations work on the Russian ones. This can be explained by the fact that, in general, Russian students better evaluate EU Member States public administrations than Russian ones, even if only 77,4% of them have already dealt with a public administration of a Member Country of the EU. Indeed, 54,8% of them think that Russian public administrations work *“worse than public administrations of EU Member States”*, and only one person thinks they work *“a lot better than”* the EU Member States ones. Moreover, to the question, *“overall, do you think Russian public administrations are efficient?”* 45,2% of the Russian students who answered the questionnaire said they were slightly efficient¹. Only 6,5% said they were *“extremely efficient”*, and more people think they are *“not efficient at all”* (9,7%). In what concerns the EU Member States public administrations, Russian students thought they are *“moder-*

¹ «Не очень эффективны».

ately efficient” (48,3%) and *“very efficient”* (41,4%). Only 3,4% asserted they are *“not efficient at all”*. This shows that the thirty-four Russian students who answered the questionnaire has a better opinion of the efficiency of EU Member States public administrations than of the ones of their country, even if only 22,6% of them have already dealt with a public administration of an EU Member States.

In what concerns the EU at large, the European Commission concedes that *“The past two decades of reforms in Member States have somewhat improved the cost effectiveness and efficiency of public administration”* (19. P. 1). In fact, it is one of the best reform achievements noticed, after *“service quality”* and *“fair treatment of citizens”* (20. P. 4). States who are members of the EU since 2004 carried out significant administrative reforms to prepare for EU membership, but countless reforms across Europe are political or budgetary based more than human based, which puts a limit to the change of the administrative structure and culture. Even for the newly arrived Member States, reforms were hard to carry on and *“sustainability was often compromised by a lack of political consensus about substance and direction, a failure to tackle underlying politicisation, and weak, unstable core government institutions”* (19. P. 3). This report also underlined the gap between the modernisation amendments and the working practices. Indeed, the executive capacity does not always follow the legal one, especially for Greece, Cyprus and Hungary, on the contrary of Denmark, Finland and the UK. For example, eGovernment services have been launched but this does not necessarily mean the country is more performing than others which did not put in place this modernisation program. Indeed, if they are well-designed, they can enhance the quality and the efficiency of public administrations, as well as the services they furnish. For some EU countries, the use of online services is compulsory (half of them have made one or more online service obligatory), but the public does not always know how to use it¹. Moreover, countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Croatia, Romania and south-eastern countries in general do not have a good per-

¹ *“The online channel is the default channel for up to 43% of citizen services. However, 48% of EU citizens needing to use public services are still unable to use the online channel”* (19).

formance ratio¹. Indeed, it is lower than 50%, while Nordic countries' is higher than 75% (19. P. 5).

In comparison, confidence and satisfaction across government institutions in OECD countries is 40% for the national government, 51% for the judicial system, 72% for the education system, 66% for healthcare and 71% for the local police (5 p. 168). As a consequence, it is possible to say that Russian people trust better their education and social security systems in general, but that it is the contrary for the police one. In the EU, Member States have to follow administrative procedures², that is to say, several steps defined in advance and easily accessed by the public. "*Certain public managers tend to sacrifice the administrative procedures for the sake of efficiency*" (21. P. 3). But, to maintain equity, transparency and the quality of public services provided or produced in those States, those procedures shall be respected. Indeed, it allows controls during the procedures and it is a guarantee that the public decision remains predictable and respects individual expectations. This control can be done according to the administrative law which protects the individuals and citizens personal rights and interests and balances public authorities will upon them. For a long time in France, "*administrative law was the law on the administrative act understood as something awarding or removing individual rights*" (21. P. 4), and the importance of the act was prevailing on the procedure and the Conseil d'Etat³ had to make it evolve by its jurisprudence. By doing so, procedures became important in the administrative process. For example, the civil service has three branches which are the central and local governments and hospitals, employing altogether 5,2 million people, mainly by the central government. Their "*main obligations [...] involve professional discretion, informing the public, performing the tasks entrusted to them, following orders from superiors and discretion*" (22. P. 19). Thus, efficiency and a hierarchical system are mentioned. Moreover, being employed according to a diploma and the competences a civil servant has is also part of the recruitment system. Indeed, civil servants can be recruited on a contractual basis but also after having

¹ "*Performance is measured as an average of scores for top level benchmarks: user centricity, transparency, cross-border mobility, key enablers*" (19).

² "*An administrative procedure is the formal path, established in legislation, which an administrative action should follow*" (21).

³ The highest jurisdiction in the French administrative hierarchy.

passed a competitive examination. For this reason, they should go to special schools and follow training in specialised institutes, such as the National School of Administration or one of the five Regional Administration Institutes available. This ensures civil servants to have a minimum of efficiency and productivity, and install a certain meritocracy. Nonetheless, in 2017, roughly 30% of French people wanted their administration and public services to be more efficient (23). They would like it to be done mainly by reducing the public debt, but also by taking more into account the users' expectations, for 30% of them as well. Moreover, 51% estimated that local authorities are "inefficient", 3% that they are "very efficient" and 46% "quite efficient" (24) especially in what concerns the transports and waste management. According to the same poll, 39% of the asked persons, reducing the number of levels of communities is a solution, as well as improving the recruitment and training of territorial agents for 24% of them.

Many OECD countries also sought to increase their productivity, especially if they endured a crisis, and for that invested in innovative tools to rationalise acquisition processes and achieve a better capital gain and bigger economies of scale. "In particular, these tools include the increased use of e-procurement platforms, framework agreements, pre-qualification systems, electronic reverse auctions and contracts with options" (5. P. 134). Indeed, through them, citizens can better be informed and have a better access to the procedures they must fulfil, and fulfil them online. It can also reduce administrative clutter and decrease the time of completion of the task. Those procedures are called "e-procurement" and can be defined as "the use of information and communication technologies in public procurement". 97% of the OECD member countries say they tend to resort to them. Thus, among the OECD countries, twenty of them use a national central e-procurement system and e-procurement systems of specific procuring entities to publish procurement plans about forecast government need. Thirty-two announce tenders and sixteen resorts to electronic submission of bids (except by emails). For example, France created a specific online portal called the "French government modernisation portal", which gives information about the missions and the organisation of the Secretariat General for Government Modernisation's (SGMAP). Its aim is to "provide[s] assistance to the French Government for the implementation of government reform and support to public authorities for their modernisation projects" (25). This reform's

objective is to encourage the public sector to implement new methods so that it is more efficient, especially when carrying out new public policies. For that, it is working on the development of new digital technologies in the government, to upgrade its quality of service. Its aim is to be able to better respond to the public's needs and questions. Its goal is also to foster a transparent and collaborative government, with the intention of simplifying it, notably its procedures. This reform is coordinated by the Simplification Task Force which accompanies ministers and institutional partners. For instance, an open-data collaborative platform¹ has been launched. Finally, France is a co-chair of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) since 2014 but, on the contrary, Russia decided to withdraw from this latter. Indeed, even if Russia submitted a letter of intent in April 2012 during the first annual meeting of the Open Government Partnership in Brazil, it withdrew it in 2017. Nonetheless, in February 2012, Russia launched an open data platform² as well and established an “*open data council*”, which counts as a step towards transparency and accountability. Russia was willing to create an Open Government “*ecosystem*” (26), especially by forming, for example, a site called “*Russia Without Fools*”³. This site is a crowdsourcing citizens-to-government feedback portal in case of abuse or “*officials' stupidity*” (27). Indeed, as Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said in January 2013, “*those technologies change the status and enhance the legitimacy of decisions made in government*” (28). However, its withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership puts in perspective this objective he put has a priority when declaring it as a principle of his government, as well as the one to reduce corruption. Therefore, even if Russia committed itself to improve its transparency, it is not clear how. Undeniably, planning to establish more transparency is a first step towards accountability. Nonetheless, this movement is quite recently compared to Western countries, where legislation concerning free access to government information started not in 2006–2015, but in the 1970s.

According to the answers given by EU Member States students to the questionnaire, most of them (35,7%%) think that the EU slightly influences the way Russian public administration's work. The second most

¹ See <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/>.

² See <https://data.mos.ru/>, also accessible in English.

³ See <http://россиябездураков.рф/>.

important percentage signifies that 28,6%% of them think it moderately influences them. Therefore, in general, students from EU Member States do not perceive a clear influence of the way EU public administrations work on the Russian ones, even less than the Russian students themselves. It is relevant to specify that all the European students who answered the questionnaire dealt both with Russian and EU Member States public administrations. 57,1% of them think that Russian public administrations work “*worse than public administrations of EU Member States*”, and none of them think they work “*a lot better than*” the EU Member States ones. Thus, they consider better EU Member States public administrations than Russian students. Furthermore, to the question, “*overall, do you think Russian public administrations are efficient?*” 35,7% of the European students said they were moderately efficient. Only 7,1% said they were “*extremely efficient*”, and more people think they are “*not efficient at all*” (21,4%). Accordingly, there are more students who thought they are “*moderately efficient*”, which is more positive, but, at the same time, more than twice of them think they are “*not efficient at all*”, compared to Russian students. In what concerns the EU Member States public administrations, European students thought they are “*moderately efficient*” (42,9%) and “*very efficient*” (21,4%). None of them asserted they are “*not efficient at all*”. This means that the fourteen European students who answered the questionnaire tend to think that Russian public administrations are more efficient than the ones in EU Member States. Indeed, even if the same number of European students think EU Member States and Russian public administrations are “*slightly efficient*” (28,6%), 21,4% think EU Member States public administrations are “*not efficient at all*” and that Russian public administrations are “*very efficient*”. Finally, a bigger number of European students think Russian public administrations are “*moderately efficient*” (42,9%), compared to the EU Member States ones (35,7%).

Given to the fact that the efficiency issue has been addressed, the study will focus on the corruption¹ one.

¹ Corruption can be defined as “*the abuse of power for private gain. Corruption takes many forms, such as bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, but can also hide behind nepotism, conflicts of interest, or revolving doors between the public and the private sectors*” (44).

A corruption issue among EU Member States and Russian public administrations

Russia is ranked as the 135th country the most corrupted out of 180 according to Transparency International (29). This organisation evaluated the perceived level of corruption in public sectors by experts and businesspeople. It used a scale of 0 to 100 and if 100 is very clean, 0 is highly corrupt, and Russia has a score of 29/100. Civil service pay is an explanation of this high level of corruption in Russia. Indeed, *“it has long been argued that one reason for endemic corruption is that civil service pay is too low overall and that civil service pay is too compact”* (7. P. 122), especially in comparison with the private sector. Therefore, it is possible to wonder if a higher pay would encourage young people to work in the civil service, as a survey conducted in 2005 demonstrated it. According to this last, *“17% of young Russian people would consider working in the civil service but [...] another 47% of respondents would consider a civil service career if the pay is substantially higher”* (7. P. 122). To be able to compare these results with what Russian students from Tomsk State University think, they have been asked whether or not they consider a civil service career. It appears that twice more students would consider it (35,5%), but twice fewer young people would consider it if the pay was substantially higher (20%, instead of 47% according to the OECD Survey). In general, it is possible to say that Russian students who answered the questionnaire are not willing to work as a civil servant, even if they are considerably better paid. To justify themselves, they asserted that *“That's not mine. I think that the existing system does not allow to conduct a correct selection, thanks to which the career would be promoted at the expense of professionalism, not popularity, quantity of money or acquaintance”*¹. Another said that *“I prefer a public career to creative work. First, in such activities there is great freedom to choose the direction of activity and place of work. Secondly, I negatively relate to the rigid career hierarchy that is present in State institutions. Thirdly, my personal beliefs often do not coincide with what is required of me. In my opinion, one cannot be very effective and useful in a team whose values*

¹ «Это не моё. Считаю, что существующая система не позволяет проводить корректный отбор, благодаря которому в карьере продвигались бы за счёт профессионализма, а не популярности, количеству денег или знакомства».

are alien to you”¹. Others mentioned corruption, disgust and boredom, or the current regime². On the other side, European students equally consider a civil service career (50% for both choices), but the majority would consider it more if the pay was substantially higher (57,1%). For those who said they would, they mentioned that “*working for public administration is safe (in matter of employment), so if it could be safe and very well paid, it’s all bonuses for me*” and that “*there is no pressure to develop and be a better version of yourself*”. For those who would not, they asserted that they are “*not interested in those kinds of jobs*” and career. Therefore, the answers appear to be less politicized and focused on values, as well as more focused on the skills and tasks a civil servant career undertakes.

It also appears that the more the position is centralised, the more the official occupying this position earns. Thus, officials in central federal institutions earn more than the ones at municipal level. Moreover, Meritocracy is hardly the rule as there are monetary encouragement but is not necessarily linked to performance, and senior civil servants may complete their low wage with bonuses and supplements that can reach more than fifteen times their original salary, which blurs the administrative hierarchy as defined by Max Weber. For example, in 2017, the average monthly nominal wage of people working in “*Administrative and support service activities*”, “*Public administration and defence; compulsory social security*”, “*Education*” and “*Human health and social work activi-*

¹ «Я предпочитаю государственной карьере творческую деятельность. Во-первых, в такой деятельности есть большая свобода для выбора направления деятельности и места работы. Во-вторых, я негативно отношусь к жёсткой карьерной иерархии, которая присутствует в госучреждениях. В-третьих, мои личные убеждения часто не совпадают с тем, что от меня требуют. На мой взгляд, нельзя быть очень эффективным и полезным в коллективе, ценности которого тебе чужды».

² «Чтобы быть госслужащим нужно быть лояльным к политическому режиму, я его не поддерживаю», which can be translated by «*to be civil servants need to be loyal to the political regime, I do not support it*».

«Я бы не хотела, чтобы моя работа была напрямую связана с государственной властью, так как не хочу быть ассоциированной с существующим государственным строем», which means «*I would not want my work to be directly connected with the State power, since I do not want to be associated with the existing State system*».

ties” was, respectively, 30 225 (429,06 euros), 38 897 (551,93 euros), 31 194 (442,63 euros) and 30 971 (439,42 euros) (30). Those incomes are lower than the total wages as they averaged 38 400 roubles (539,38 euros) per month in January 2018 (31). Moreover, Russia’s average monthly nominal wage in April 2018 was of 589,71 euros (43 381 roubles) (32). Therefore, people working in the public administrations previously mentioned earn less than the average monthly nominal wage in Russia, but three times more than the minimum wage, which was of 11 163 roubles (151, 23 euros) per month in May 2018 (33). On the contrary, the average income of the population aged of 18 and over in the European Union was of 18 553 euros (1 320 960,83 roubles) in 2017 (34) and its Purchasing Power Standard was of 17 462 in 2016, according to the same site. Per month, in France for example, the average monthly wage is 2 998 euros (213 443,65 roubles) in December 2015 (31), but the minimum wage is, without taxes, 1498,47 euros per month (35). The average net monthly wage of people working in public administrations was of 1 750 euros (36) (128 703,40 roubles). Moreover, the article 20 of the Law of the 13 July 1983 (37) states that civil servants’ remuneration and advancement are based on the employee’s grade and the rank one has achieved, or on the post to which one has been appointed. Civil servants are affiliated to the special pension and social security schemes. In conclusion, it is possible to say that even if French civil servants earn less than the average monthly wage, they earn more than the French minimum wage as well. Nonetheless, Russian civil servants earn 2,94¹ times more than the Russian minimum wage, while French civil servants earn 1,2 times² more than the French minimum wage, which is lower.

As a consequence, Russia launched a few laws to fight against corruption, among which a Federal Law on the 25th of December 2008, more precisely its article 13.3, to fight against corruption. This article asserts that organisations are obliged to develop and to take measures to prevent corruption. It suggests it could be done by the creation of special units or the employment of officials whose job would be to prevent from it. Another way to prevent it is, as mentioned in the article, that organisations cooperate with law enforcement bodies, but also to develop and introduce standards and procedures aimed at ensuring a work without corruption.

¹ Calculation: $(30\ 225 + 38\ 897 + 31\ 194 + 30\ 971) / 4 = 11\ 163$

² Calculation: $1750 / 1448,47$

Moreover, the anti-corruption action underlies the adoption of a code of ethics and official conduct employees can adopt. Finally, it relies on the prevention of the preparation of unofficial accounts (38). Another law which contributes to this fight is the article 575 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, dated from the 26th of January 1996 and then amended on the 23rd of May 2018, which prohibits donations. Indeed, it asserts that gifts other than ordinary gifts whose cost does not exceed three thousand roubles, are not allowed. The concerned public is employees of educational organisations, medical organisations, organisations providing social services or similar, people holding public office in the Federation, notably the public offices of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Moreover; are also indicated civil servants, municipal employees, employees of the Bank of Russia in connection with their official position or while practising their trade. Nonetheless, this excludes donations in case of protocol events, business trips of other official events. In case those people mentioned above receive a gift whose value exceeds three thousand roubles become the property of the Russian Federation or municipal property (39). Vladimir Putin himself asserted after the mas anti-corruption rallies that took place on the 26th of March 2016 in Russia that “the issues of fighting corruption are constantly at the centre of public attention”. However, he added that this effort should not serve people political personal interests, for example, to promote themselves in the political arena on the eve of political events, such as campaigns. Indeed, he asserted that this led to a coup d’État in Ukraine (40).

As for Russian students studying at Tomsk State University, one third (32,3%) of them consider that Russian public administrations are “*extremely corrupted*”, and almost one other third (29%) think they are “*very corrupted*”. None of them think they are “*not corrupted at all*”. One of them even said that corruption the reason why he would not consider a civil service career, even if the pay was substantially higher. Another answered that he could not “*adjust to the long-built system of corruption*”¹. On the contrary, the majority of them (51,7%) think that EU Member States’ public administrations are “*moderately corrupted*”. None of them think they are “*extremely corrupted*” but the same amount (22,7%) think they are “*slightly*” and “*not corrupted at all*”. Finally,

¹ In Russian: “Придется подстраиваться под давно выстроенную систему коррупции».

only 6,9% of them think they are “*very corrupted*”, which shows they have a better opinion of the EU Member States’ public administrations than their own public administrations, in what concerns corruption.

Nonetheless, in EU Member States, corruption can be perceived as well. Indeed, in 2012, for 74% of Europeans corruption was a major problem in their country (41. P. 8). The most corrupted country was Somalia, and the less corrupt nation was Denmark (42). Moreover, “*the areas in which reported petty corruption is higher, in terms of the percentage of bribe cases per contact, are on average: Medical services 6,2%, land services 5%, customs 4,8%, judiciary 4,2%, police 3,8%, registry and permit service 3,8%, education system 2,5%, utilities 2,5%, tax revenue 1,9%*” (41. P. 2), that is to say, areas managed by public administrations, even if there can be massive differences between countries, depending on the areas concerned. This has a cost, estimated at 120 billion euros per year, which represents 1% of the GDP according to the Commission Communication quoted in the same study. At a political level as well, even if Member States tend to declare they fight those weaknesses, “*they are particularly weak when it comes to putting in place and enforcing anti-corruption safeguards*” (43. P. 14), which underline the division between what the law declares and how it is implemented. The link with public administration can be done thanks to the fact that bribery or the use of connections is an easier way to access public services. Moreover, it can be noted when public funds are diverted. However, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in its article 83.1 asserts that corruption is a “*euro-crime*” and one of the most serious one given to its international and cross-border dimension¹, along with terrorism and trafficking with human beings. To measure efforts in this field, the Stockholm Programme has been adopted. It gives the Commission, in co-operation with the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption², a political mandate for this and allow it to develop a comprehensive EU anti-corruption policy. For example, the Council of Europe adopted several legal instruments to fight corruption, such as a Criminal Law Convention on Corrup-

¹ «*These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.*” (58).

² See: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home>.

tion (ETS 173)¹, a Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174)², twenty Guiding Principles against Corruption (Resolution (97) 24)³, as well as two Recommendations. The first one is on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials⁴ and the second one on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns⁵. Notwithstanding, even if Member States can have different anti-corruption policies, they may have a single national contact point to facilitate exchange on anti-corruption policy. Moreover, in comparison with the Russian law to fight corruption, the *“Commission’s anti-corruption efforts are centred around the following main pillars: mainstreaming anti-corruption provisions in EU horizontal and sectorial legislation and policy; monitoring performances in the fight against corruption by Member States; supporting the implementation of anti-corruption measures at national level via funding, technical assistance and experience-sharing; improving the quantitative evidence base for anti-corruption policy.”* (44). In what concerns officials of the EU and of Member States, an anti-corruption Convention exists, dated from the 26th of March 1997. This Convention mentions passive⁶ and active corruption⁷. It encourages each Member State to take the necessary measures to avoid it. In France for

¹ See: https://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/173?coconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_languageId=en_GB.

² See: https://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/174?coconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_languageId=en_GB.

³ See: <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806cc17c>.

⁴ See: <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806cc1ec>.

⁵ See: <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806cc1f1>.

⁶ Which can be defined as *« the deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties shall constitute passive corruption. »* (59).

⁷ Which can be defined as *“the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties shall constitute active corruption.”* (59).

example, 68% of the population think corruption is widespread, which is less than the EU average which amounts to 76% (45. P. 25). According to this report, over the last twelve months, 2% of the respondents have been asked or were expected to pay a bribe for somebody's services, knowing that the EU average is 4%. 19% of those people thought that "*Government efforts to combat corruption are effective*", and 21% that "*There are enough successful prosecutions in France to deter people from corrupt practices*". However, 90% asserted that there is a control of corruption and 88% that the government is effective in doing so. In fact, on the 9th of November 2016, through the law Sapin II, fight against transnational corruption and whistle-blowers' protection experienced a breakthrough, even if will not be enough to solve all the issues this fight underlies in France, according to Transparency International France¹. However, it concerns French companies. With respect to people holding public authority, a public service mission or a public elected office, the article 433-1 of the Penal Code punishes of ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 1 000 000 euros anybody who offers or promises them, without right, at any time, directly or indirectly, gifts, presents or any advantages. Before 2013, the fine was of 150 000 euros. Nowadays, ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 150 000 euros is the sanction the article 432-11 of the Penal Code applies when people previously mentioned soliciting or accredit these offers and promises. Finally, the Anticor association², founded in 2002, fights against corruption and has the aim to restore ethics in politics. It wants to re-establish the trust relationship that should exist between citizens and their representatives, whether they are politicians or members of public administrations. It brings together citizens and politicians of all political tendencies. They wrote a chart can mention to the judiciary court facts that may receive a penal qualification, and help whistle-blowers by the same way.

If we compare the data given by the European Commission and the questionnaires' answers, we shall conclude that the questioned students are more confident about the corruption issue public administrations in EU Member State face. Indeed, 71,4% of them think that these last are

¹ «*Ces avancées importantes qu'il faut saluer ne suffiront toutefois pas à elles seules à répondre à l'ensemble des enjeux de la lutte contre la corruption en France.*» (60).

² See: <http://www.anticor.org/>.

“slightly corrupted” and 21,4% that they are “not corrupted at all”. Only 7,1% asserted they are “very corrupted”. On the contrary, in what concerns Russian public administrations, TSU’s students from EU Member States had a more diverse opinion. Indeed, the same number (28,6%) assumes they are “moderately” and “very corrupted”. A fewer amount but the same as well (21,4%) considers they are “slightly” and “extremely corrupted”. In conclusion, it is possible to say that EU Member States’ students of TSU generally think that Russian public administrations are more corrupted than theirs. For example, none of them think the Russian ones are “not corrupted at all”, and, percentages added, 50% of them think they are “very” and “extremely corrupted”. The last criteria this study addresses is transparency, which will be seen in the next section.

A transparency issue among EU Member States and Russia public administrations

Transparency can be defined as “*the quality of being done in an open way without secrets [...] so that people can trust that they are fair and honest*” (46). In the same way, according to Max Weber, a purely bureaucratic administration should inspire trust to the citizens it serves. For that, even if, globally, Russian and OECD countries’ governments have the objective to develop an open data strategy, they do not tend to always do it the same way. For example, Russia and OECD member countries have the objective to increase transparency¹ and openness², facilitate creation of new businesses³ and facilitate citizen participation in public debate⁴. However, on the one hand, Russian Federation is ready to create economic value for the public sector, contrary to any OECD member country. On the other hand, eleven Member Countries of the OECD are ready to improve the public sector and performance by strengthening accountability for outputs and outcomes. Fourteen are prepared to deliver public services more effectively and efficiently by improving internal operations and collaboration. Thirteen are willing to enable delivery from

¹ For 17 of them.

² For 16 of them.

³ For 15 of them.

⁴ For 7 of them.

the private sector through data reuse. Sixteen are inclined to create economic value for the private sector or increase the volume of private sector business activity. Seven are predisposed to enable citizen engagement in decision-making processes, while Russia does not have those objectives (5. P. 141). Nonetheless, is it possible to say that those goals are achieved?

“Transparency is a relatively recent value in the administration of EU Member States except in Sweden where the right to anybody to view the files was established by a Law of 1766)” (21. P. 5). Additionally, among OECD countries, less than 50% of citizens have confidence in their national government. More specifically, this last was, in 2012, of 50% in France and of 45–47% in Russia (5. P. 25) but, generally, this confidence is higher in BRICS countries that are Brazil, Russia, India and China, than in the OECD. Moreover, thanks to the evolution of its administrative procedures, efficiency and transparency in public administrations could be better guaranteed. Nonetheless, a 2017 poll (23) asserted that 46% of the French people questioned said the quest for a bigger administration and public service efficiency should be a priority for the next president, that is to say, Emmanuel Macron. As transparency is also linked to trust, it is possible to add that the level of citizens’ confidence in EU institutions that are the Council of the European Union, European Parliament and European Commission in 2014 was of 38% for France and 42% for the European Union (47). Levels of satisfaction and trust can also be evaluated in different public services. As for France for example, 75% of French people trusted the local police in 2012 (5. P. 167). However, the criteria selected to refer to transparency in this article are budget transparency and illegal work.

First, a national budget can be defined as *“one of the principal policy documents of government, reflecting its policy objectives and spending authorities”*. Therefore, budget transparency is *“the disclosure and accessibility of key fiscal and budgetary information”* (5. P. 144). The need of a more transparent budget increased with the economic and social crisis. It relies on the systematic share of government budgetary information, and in particular its quality, probity and accessibility. Indeed, it allows citizens to be informed and to hold government accountable if they think those principles are not respected. Also, the best they understand fiscal policies, the best they understand their government’s priorities and can trust it, especially in the case when the availability of the information

matches with its accuracy. For that, openness should come along with easiness so that the non-expert public is not confused by the technical language used and the quantity of information provided. Some OECD countries ensure it by publishing citizens' budget-easy to understand summary documents about their annual budget, with definitions and explanations. On this point, if we compare the Russian Federation and EU Member States, especially France, it is possible to say that in 2012, the Russian Federation had a citizens' guide to the budget while France had not, even if the same year was launched in France the Practical Guide of the organic law relating to the finance laws whose aim was to understand the State's budget. However, once on the page, this document is no longer accessible¹. If not a document, a site² is available to explain its various aspects. Moreover, in what concerns the public availability of budgetary information, the Russian Federation is the country which does the best given to the fact that it publishes "*medium-term policy objectives*", "*budget proposals*", "*approved budgets*", "*methodology and economic assumptions for establishing fiscal projections*", "*sensitivity analysis of fiscal and/or macroeconomic models*", "*budget circular*", "*independent reviews/analyses*", "*pre-budget report*" and "*long-term perspective on total revenue and expenditure*" (5 p. 145). In comparison, France publishes all those documents except the last one. Also, on the 11th of October 2013 was adopted a law on the transparency of public life to prevent conflict of interests. It concerns members of government, the holders of an elective office and the people entrusted with a public service mission. For example, members of the government must personally submit to the President of the High Authority for the transparency of public life a declaration of the patrimonial situation and a declaration of interests, as soon as they are appointed, as well as on the occasion of any substantial change. Their assets or the interests they hold (48).

It is also possible to consider undeclared casual work as a lack of transparency. Undeclared work is defined as "*any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to public authorities, taking account differences in the regulatory systems of the Member States*"

¹ See: <https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/ressources-documents/rapports-et-guides-pratiques/guide-pratique-de-la-lolf.html>.

² See: <https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/budget-comptes-etat/budget-etat>.

(49). It has bad consequences both on employers and on the State as a whole because companies which are creating such undeclared jobs pay fewer contributions and therefore can provide cheaper goods and services. It creates an unfair competition. As a consequence, the State has less money to provide social services and undeclared workers can hardly enhance their skills and perceive training. Among the European Union, it is difficult to evaluate it because Member States define it differently in their national legislation. For example, in France, it is defined as followed: *“is deemed to be a hidden work when there is the concealment of activity, a for-profit exercise of an activity of production, processing, repairing or rendering of services or the performance of acts of commerce by any person who, intentionally avoiding his obligations”* (50). In comparison is Spain, it is called an irregular or a black work and is defined as *“all those activities that for their nature are defined as illegal, which are part of the criminal economy”*. Another definition is: *“conventional productive activities that are carried out in violation of tax or labour legislation”* (51. P. 3). In Russia, it is called the informal sector and, in 2015, it represented 20,5% of the total amount of the labour force. From 2006, this percentage increased, even if it slowed down in 2010. It concerned 22, 2% of the men and 18,2% of the women. Always in 2015, the most affected working sector was the one of “wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household products and personal items”, and the less affected one “mining”. If added the people working in the informal sector in the “Education”, “Healthcare and the provision of social services” and the “Provision of other communal, social and personal services” sectors, the result represents one fourth of the most affected sector (52. P. 98). Therefore, those areas, representatives of the public administrations, are not a lot concerned by illegal work. In the European Union, France is one of the labour inspectorate Member States if the field of undeclared work. Moreover, according *“All Member States have in the last ten years introduced measures to step up their efforts in the fight against undeclared work, given its negative consequences. All Member States have made use of the deterrence measures to influence people’s behaviour with stricter sanctions or focusing on more effective inspections. In addition, Member States are using preventive measures, such as tax incentives, amnesties and awareness raising, to decrease the incidence of undeclared work and facilitate compliance with the existing rules.”* (53). Contrary to the Federation of Russia, the European Union as

the cross-border aspect of undeclared work to tackle. This is the reason why seventeen countries are labouring inspectorates, two are social security inspectorates and seven have a tax authority. One Member State cannot be part of two of those groups. However, it consists more in a cooperation, coordination and exchange of good practices than a sanction mechanism. In percentage of the labour force, Italy and Portugal are the most affected by undeclared work, with a percentage of 22,4%, which is higher than in Russia. The less touched one is Lithuania, with a percentage of 6,4% of the labour force. France's percentage of undeclared work in the labour force is 10,3%, which is half Russia's (53). Therefore, even if Russia and EU Member States do not have the same means to tackle the shadow economy, especially because Russia cannot count on another government than his to fight it, some European countries have the same proportion of undeclared work as the Russian Federation.

With respect to the questionnaires, Russian students of TSU asserted that Russian public administrations are in majority *“moderately transparent”* (41,9%). None of them said they are *“very transparent”*, but one third of them said they are *“not transparent”*. As 6,5% of them also said they are *“slightly transparent”*, the percentage of people thinking that they are *“moderately”* and not very transparent is very close. However, they have a better opinion of the EU Member States public administrations because most them (55,2%) think they are *“moderately transparent”*. Even if 17,2% of them think they are *“slightly transparent”*, almost twice this amount (27,6%) think that they are. Concordantly, they trust more the public administrations from EU Member States than theirs (at 31% for the first ones and 12,9% for the seconds). However, almost the same proportion of them *“completely trust”* the Russian and the EU Member States public administrations (9,7% for the Russian ones and 10,3% for the EU Member States ones). In fact, the decisive point is that 16,1% of the Russian TSU students *“do not trust at all”* their public administrations, while none them do for the EU Member countries' ones. It can explain why 42,9% of them are *“satisfied”* with EU Member States public administrations while only 17,2% of them are for the Russian ones. In fact, most of them (31%) *“are not satisfied”* that last. On the contrary, none of them are not satisfied with EU Member States public administrations. The reasons they invoked are that, in Russia, *“If I need some kind of service, then on many websites of state institutions nothing is clear and nothing really can be found. Queues, there is no clear list of*

requirements for documents. Incompetence and malevolence of people that worked with me”¹. Others said that “Getting a passport, getting a job in a state institution, working in a state institution is a continuous paperwork”² and that their work is unorganized³.

In what concerns TSU EU Member States students, more than the third of them (35,7%) think they are “not transparent at all”, and 28,6% said they are “slightly transparent”. As a consequence, students from EU Member States think in majority that Russian public administrations are not transparent. As Russian students, they also have a more positive opinion of their own administration as 50% of them asserted that public administrations in EU Member States are “moderately transparent”. However, a bigger amount thinks they are “slightly transparent” (28,6%) than that they are “very transparent”. It can explain why 50% of them “very” (35,7%) and “extremely trust” (14,3%) EU Member Countries public administrations. In fact, their opinion about them is very positive, except for the 14,3% who “slightly trust” them. On the contrary, the majority of them “slightly trust” (42,9%) and “do not trust at all” (14,3%) the Russian public administrations. Therefore, the proportion of those who do not trust the Russian public administrations is bigger than the one that trusts public administrations in EU Member Countries. An example of this is that one respondent “had to pay twice for the rent of [his] room in the student dormitory, because the receipt of [his] first payment has gone lost”. Some others said that was a “poor communication”, and pointed out the absurdity of the system⁴. As a result, it is easy to understand that 61,5% of them are “dissatisfied” with Russian public administrations, even “very dissatisfied” for 7,7% of them, while the same last number is

¹ In Russian in the questionnaire: «Если мне нужна какая-то услуга, то на многих сайтах госучреждений ничего непонятно и ничего толком не найти. Очереди, нет внятного списка требований по документам. Некомпетентность и недоброжелательность людей, что со мной работали».

² In Russian is the questionnaire: “Получение загранпаспорта, трудоустройство в госучреждение, работа в госучреждении-сплошная бумажная волокита».

³ In Russian in the questionnaire: “Большие очереди и неорганизованная работа».

⁴ One asserted that thanks to the registration system, “they know exactly where we have been of what we have done but of you don't have a simple and easily fakeable sheet of paper you make get blocked on the border, it is simply absurd”.

the only one who is “dissatisfied” with EU Member States public administrations. Indeed, 69,2% are “*satisfied*” of them and none of them are “*very dissatisfied*”.

Concluding Considerations

The question this article aimed to answer was, is the modernisation of public administrations a reality in the EU Member States and in the Russian Federation? For that, it was first assessed what was being a public administration and in what consists its modernisation according to Max Weber. This author asserted that a modern public administration should work as a company, be impersonal, based on impartiality, objectivity and regularity. If it is so, an administrative hierarchy can be observed and controlled, as well as its civil servants. For their part, civil servants must obey only to the obligations that go with their office, have a professional qualification, work under a contract and obey to the chief's orders when complying to the objective duty of their function. This way, the public administration can achieve technical perfection, be as performing as possible and inspire trust. Secondly, those standards were compared to the ones governments in EU Member States, especially France, and in the Russian Federation apply. For that, several media have been analysed and compared, for example, laws, official reports, articles, etc. Thirdly, official studies about citizens' opinions about the application of those standards have been found. As a result, when a government declared it would modernise its administration, polls were found to assess if people were thinking the modernisation was actual or not, when possible. For example, I could not find if Russian people trust their public administrations and if they think it is corrupted or not. Fourthly, that information was then compared to TSU's students under twenty-five years old, Russians and from EU Member States. In conclusion, it is possible to uphold that, in general, Russian students have a better opinion about the public administrations of EU Member States than theirs, even if more than three quarters (77,4%) of the respondents have never dealt with a public administration in an EU Member State. On the contrary, European students have a better opinion about public administrations in the EU Member States. It coincides with the official data found. Indeed, even if Russia does not provide complete comparative information on such subjects, the OECD and the European Commission does, albeit Russian is not always

mentioned. There is only one subject where Russia does a bit better than France, which is transparency. However, Russian students do not agree with those efforts. On the contrary, the fourteen European students who answered the questionnaire tend to think that Russian public administrations are more efficient than the ones in EU Member States. Moreover, on a legislative point of view, it is important to specify that the European Union has a great influence on its Member States efforts to modernise their public administrations, while Russia has not. Sometimes, as for corruption for example, the European Union does even more on the side than Member States themselves. The limit is that, about corruption, the European Union has no systematic legal authority to convict Member States to respect its convention, resolutions and recommendations. Finally, it is possible to conclude that even if EU Member States and the Russian Federation tended to modernise their public administrations and improve their efficiency, transparency, as well as reducing their level of corruption, they both still have a lot of efforts to modernise their administrations, in theory and in practice. However, it appears Russia has more efforts to make, as “*Russia looks more interested in opting towards more controllable, technocratic options that involve discretionary data releases instead of an independent judiciary or freedom of assembly or the press* » (54). The heritage of the Soviet State is not innocent to it, as informal structures or personal network remains, especially in the party-State apparatus to function, and the personalisation of relationships prevails.

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